What did the Fed do in response to the COVID-19 crisis?

HOW DID THE FED SUPPORT THE U.S. ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS? ... In September 2020, reflecting the Fed's new monetary policy framework, ... Skiptomaincontent FacebookTwitterLinkedInPrintSMSEmailMoreReddit Formediainquiries,contact: BrieannaNicker [email protected] 202.540.7721 Editor'sNote: JeffreyCheng,TylerPowell,andDavidSkidmorecontributedtoearlierversionsofthispost. EricMilstein ResearchAnalyst-TheHutchinsCenteronFiscalandMonetaryPolicy DavidWessel Director-TheHutchinsCenteronFiscalandMonetaryPolicy SeniorFellow-EconomicStudies Twitter davidmwessel ThecoronaviruscrisisintheUnitedStates—andtheassociatedbusinessclosures,eventcancellations,andwork-from-homepolicies—triggeredadeepeconomicdownturn.Thesharpcontractionanddeepuncertaintyaboutthecourseofthevirusandeconomysparkeda“dashforcash”—adesiretoholddepositsandonlythemostliquidassets—thatdisruptedfinancialmarketsandthreatenedtomakeadiresituationmuchworse.TheFederalReservesteppedinwithabroadarrayofactionstokeepcreditflowingtolimittheeconomicdamagefromthepandemic.TheseincludedlargepurchasesofU.S.governmentandmortgage-backedsecuritiesandlendingtosupporthouseholds,employers,financialmarketparticipants,andstateandlocalgovernments.“Wearedeployingtheselendingpowerstoanunprecedentedextent[and]…willcontinuetousethesepowersforcefully,proactively,andaggressivelyuntilweareconfidentthatwearesolidlyontheroadtorecovery,”JeromePowell,chairoftheFederalReserveBoardofGovernors, saidinApril2020.Inthatsamemonth,PowelldiscussedtheFed’sgoalsduringa webinar attheBrookings’HutchinsCenteronFiscalandMonetaryPolicy.ThispostsummarizestheFed’sactionsthoughtheendof2021. HOWDIDTHEFEDSUPPORTTHEU.S.ECONOMYANDFINANCIALMARKETS? EasingMonetaryPolicy Federalfundsrate: TheFedcutits targetforthefederalfundsrate,theratebankspaytoborrowfromeachotherovernight,byatotalof1.5percentagepointsatitsmeetingsonMarch3andMarch15,2020.Thesecutsloweredthefundsratetoarangeof0%to0.25%.Thefederalfundsrateisabenchmarkforothershort-termrates,andalsoaffectslonger-termrates,sothismovewasaimedatsupportingspendingbyloweringthecostofborrowingforhouseholdsandbusinesses. Forwardguidance: UsingatoolhonedduringtheGreatRecessionof2007-09,theFedofferedforwardguidanceonthefuturepathofinterestrates.Initially,itsaidthatitwouldkeepratesnearzero“untilitisconfidentthattheeconomyhasweatheredrecenteventsandisontracktoachieveitsmaximumemploymentandpricestabilitygoals.”InSeptember2020,reflectingtheFed’snew monetarypolicyframework,itstrengthenedthatguidance,sayingthatrateswouldremainlow“untillabormarketconditionshavereachedlevelsconsistentwiththeCommittee’sassessmentsofmaximumemploymentandinflationhasrisento2percentandisontracktomoderatelyexceed2percentforsometime.”Bytheendof2021,inflationwaswellabovetheFed’s2%targetandlabormarketswerenearingtheFed’s“maximumemployment”target.AtitsDecember2021meeting,theFed’spolicy-makingcommittee,theFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC),signaledthatmostofitsmembersexpectedtoraiseinterestratesinthreeone-quarterpercentagepointmovesin2022. Quantitativeeasing(QE): TheFedresumedpurchasingmassiveamountsofdebtsecurities,akeytoolitemployedduringtheGreatRecession.RespondingtotheacutedysfunctionoftheTreasuryandmortgage-backedsecurities(MBS)marketsaftertheoutbreakofCOVID-19,theFed’sactionsinitiallyaimedtorestoresmoothfunctioningtothesemarkets,whichplayacriticalroleintheflowofcredittothebroadereconomyasbenchmarksandsourcesofliquidity.OnMarch15,2020,theFedshiftedtheobjectiveofQEtosupportingtheeconomy.Itsaidthatitwouldbuyatleast$500billioninTreasurysecuritiesand$200billioningovernment-guaranteedmortgage-backedsecuritiesover“thecomingmonths.”OnMarch23,2020,itmadethepurchasesopen-ended,sayingitwouldbuysecurities“intheamountsneededtosupportsmoothmarketfunctioningandeffectivetransmissionofmonetarypolicytobroaderfinancialconditions,”expandingthestatedpurposeofthebondbuyingtoincludebolsteringtheeconomy.InJune2020,theFedsetitsrateofpurchasestoatleast$80billionamonthinTreasuriesand$40billioninresidentialandcommercialmortgage-backedsecuritiesuntilfurthernotice.TheFedupdateditsguidanceinDecember2020toindicateitwouldslowthesepurchasesoncetheeconomyhadmade“substantialfurtherprogress”towardtheFed’sgoalsofmaximumemploymentandpricestability.InNovember2021,judgingthattesthadbeenmet,theFedbegantaperingitspaceofassetpurchasesby$10billioninTreasuriesand$5billioninMBSeachmonth.AtthesubsequentFOMCmeetinginDecember2021,theFeddoubleditsspeedoftapering,reducingitsbondpurchasesby$20billioninTreasuriesand$10billioninMBSeachmonth. SupportingFinancialMarkets Lendingtosecuritiesfirms: Throughthe PrimaryDealerCreditFacility (PDCF),aprogramrevivedfromtheglobalfinancialcrisis,theFedofferedlowinterestrateloansupto90daysto24largefinancialinstitutionsknownasprimarydealers.ThedealersprovidedtheFedwithvarioussecuritiesascollateral,includingcommercialpaperandmunicipalbonds.Thegoalwastohelpthesedealerscontinuetoplaytheirroleinkeepingcreditmarketsfunctioningduringatimeofstress.Earlyinthepandemic,institutionsandindividualswereinclinedtoavoidriskyassetsandhoardcash,anddealersencounteredbarrierstofinancingtherisinginventoriesofsecuritiestheyaccumulatedastheymademarkets.Tore-establishthePDCF,theFedhadtoobtaintheapprovaloftheTreasurySecretarytoinvokeitsemergencylendingauthorityunder Section13(3)oftheFederalReserveAct forthefirsttimesincethe2007-09crisis.TheprogramexpiredonMarch31,2021. Backstoppingmoneymarketmutualfunds: TheFedalsore-launchedthecrisis-era MoneyMarketMutualFundLiquidityFacility (MMLF).Thisfacilitylenttobanksagainstcollateraltheypurchasedfromprimemoneymarketfunds,whichinvestinTreasurysecuritiesandcorporateshort-termIOUsknownascommercialpaper.AttheonsetofCOVID-19,investors,questioningthevalueoftheprivatesecuritiesthesefundsheld,withdrewfromprimemoneymarketfundsenmasse.Tomeettheseoutflows,fundsattemptedtoselltheirsecurities,butmarketdisruptionsmadeitdifficulttofindbuyersforevenhigh-qualityandshorter-maturitysecurities.Theseattemptstosellthesecuritiesonlydrovepriceslower(ina“firesale”)andclosedoffmarketsthatbusinessesrelyontoraisefunds.Inresponse,theFedsetuptheMMLFto“assistmoneymarketfundsinmeetingdemandsforredemptionsbyhouseholdsandotherinvestors,enhancingoverallmarketfunctioningandcreditprovisiontothebroadereconomy.”TheFedinvokedSection13(3)andobtainedpermissiontoadministertheprogramfromTreasury,whichprovided$10billionfromitsExchangeStabilizationFundtocoverpotentiallosses.Givenlimitedusage,theMMLFexpiredonMarch31,2021. Repooperations: TheFedvastlyexpandedthescopeofitsrepurchaseagreement(repo)operationstofunnelcashtomoneymarkets.Therepomarketiswherefirmsborrowandlendcashandsecuritiesshort-term,usuallyovernight.Since disruptionsintherepomarket canaffectthefederalfundsrate,theFed’srepooperationsmadecashavailabletoprimarydealersinexchangeforTreasuryandothergovernment-backedsecurities.Beforecoronavirusturmoilhitthemarket,theFedwasoffering$100billioninovernightrepoand$20billionintwo-weekrepo.Throughoutthepandemic,theFedsignificantlyexpandedtheprogram—bothintheamountsofferedandthelengthoftheloans.InJuly2021,theFedestablishedapermanentStandingRepoFacilitytobackstopmoneymarketsduringtimesofstress. ForeignandInternationalMonetaryAuthorities(FIMA)RepoFacility:SalesofU.S.Treasurysecuritiesbyforeignerswhowanteddollarsaddedtostrainsinmoneymarkets.ToensureforeignershadaccesstodollarfundingwithoutsellingTreasuriesinthemarket,theFedinJuly2021establisheda newrepofacilitycalledFIMA thatoffersdollarfundingtotheconsiderablenumberofforeigncentralbanksthatdonothaveestablishedswaplineswiththeFed.TheFedmakesovernightdollarloanstothesecentralbanks,takingTreasurysecuritiesascollateral.Thecentralbankscanthenlenddollarstotheirdomesticfinancialinstitutions. Internationalswaplines: Usinganothertoolthatwasimportantduringtheglobalfinancialcrisis,theFedmadeU.S.dollarsavailabletoforeigncentralbankstoimprovetheliquidityofglobaldollarfundingmarketsandtohelpthoseauthoritiessupporttheirdomesticbankswhoneededtoraisedollarfunding.Inexchange,theFedreceivedforeigncurrenciesandchargedinterestontheswaps.ForthefivecentralbanksthathavepermanentswaplineswiththeFed—Canada,England,theEurozone,Japan,andSwitzerland—theFedlowereditsinterestrateandextendedthematurityoftheswaps.ItalsoprovidedtemporaryswaplinestothecentralbanksofAustralia,Brazil,Denmark,Mexico,NewZealand,Norway,Singapore,SouthKorea,andSweden.InJune2021,theFedextendedthesetemporaryswapsuntilDecember31,2021. EncouragingBankstoLend Directlendingtobanks: TheFedloweredtheratethatitchargesbanksforloansfromits discountwindow by2percentagepoints,from2.25%to0.25%,lowerthanduringtheGreatRecession.Theseloansaretypicallyovernight—meaningthattheyaretakenoutattheendofonedayandrepaidthefollowingmorning—buttheFedextendedthetermsto90days.Atthediscountwindow,bankspledgeawidevarietyofcollateral(securities,loans,etc.)totheFedinexchangeforcash,sotheFedtakeslittle(orno)riskinmakingtheseloans.Thecashallowsbankstokeepfunctioning,sincedepositorscancontinuetowithdrawmoneyandthebankscanmakenewloans.However,banksaresometimes reluctanttoborrowfromthediscountwindow becausetheyfearthatifwordleaksout,marketsandotherswillthinktheyareintrouble.Tocounterthisstigma, eightbigbanksagreedtoborrowfromthediscountwindowinMarch2020. Temporarilyrelaxingregulatoryrequirements:TheFedencouragedbanks—boththe largestbanksandcommunitybanks—todipintotheirregulatorycapitalandliquiditybufferstoincreaselendingduringthepandemic.Reformsinstitutedafterthefinancialcrisisrequirebankstoholdadditionalloss-absorbingcapitaltopreventfuturefailuresandbailouts.However,thesereformsalsoincludeprovisionsthatallowbankstousetheircapitalbufferstosupportlendingindownturns.TheFedsupportedthislendingthroughatechnicalchangetoits TLAC(totalloss-absorbingcapacity)requirement—whichincludescapitalandlong-termdebt—tograduallyphaseinrestrictionsassociatedwithshortfallsinTLAC.(Topreservecapital, bigbanksalsosuspendedbuybacksoftheirshares.)TheFedalsoeliminatedbanks’reserverequirement—thepercentofdepositsthatbanksmustholdasreservestomeetcashdemand—thoughthiswaslargelyirrelevantbecausebanksheldfarmorethantherequiredreserves.TheFedrestricteddividendsandsharebuybacksofbankholdingcompaniesthroughoutthepandemic,butliftedtheserestrictionseffectiveJune30,2021,formostfirmsbasedonstresstestresults.Thesestresstestsshowedthatbankshadamplecapitaltosupportlendingeveniftheeconomyperformedfarweakerthananticipated. SupportingCorporationsandBusinesses Directlendingtomajorcorporateemployers: Inasignificantstepbeyonditscrisis-eraprograms,whichfocusedprimarilyonfinancialmarketfunctioning,theFedestablishedtwonewfacilitiestosupporttheflowofcredittoU.S.corporationsonMarch23,2020.The PrimaryMarketCorporateCreditFacility(PMCCF) allowedtheFedtolenddirectlytocorporationsbybuyingnewbondissuesandprovidingloans.Borrowerscoulddeferinterestandprincipalpaymentsforatleastthefirstsixmonthssothattheyhadcashtopayemployeesandsuppliers(buttheycouldnotpaydividendsorbuybackstock).And,underthenew SecondaryMarketCorporateCreditFacility(SMCCF),theFedcouldpurchaseexistingcorporatebondsaswellasexchange-tradedfundsinvestingininvestment-gradecorporatebonds.Anorderlysecondarymarketwasseenashelpingbusinessesaccessnewcreditintheprimarymarket.Thesefacilitiesallowed“companiesaccesstocreditsothattheyarebetterabletomaintainbusinessoperationsandcapacityduringtheperiodofdislocationsrelatedtothepandemic,”theFedsaid.Initiallysupporting$100billioninnewfinancing,theFedannouncedonApril9,2020,thatthefacilitieswouldbeincreasedtobackstopacombined$750billionofcorporatedebt.And,aswithpreviousfacilities,theFedinvokedSection13(3)oftheFederalReserveActandreceivedpermissionfromtheU.S.Treasury,whichprovided$75billionfromits ExchangeStabilizationFund tocoverpotentiallosses.Latein2020,aftertherecoveryfromthepandemicwasunderway,anddespitetheFed’smisgivings,TreasurySecretaryStevenMnuchindecidedthatthefinalbondandloanpurchasesforthecorporatecreditfacilitieswouldtakeplacenolaterthanDecember31,2020.TheFedobjectedtothecutoff,preferringtokeepthefacilitiesavailableuntiltherewasafirmerassurancethatfinancialconditionswouldnotdeteriorateagain.TheFedsaidonJune2,2021 thatitwouldgraduallyselloffits$13.7billionportfolioofcorporatebonds,whichitcompletedinDecember2021. CommercialPaperFundingFacility(CPFF): Commercialpaperisa$1.2trillionmarketinwhichfirmsissueunsecuredshort-termdebttofinancetheirday-to-dayoperations. ThroughtheCPFF,anotherreinstatedcrisis-eraprogram,the Fedboughtcommercialpaper,essentiallylendingdirectlytocorporations foruptothreemonthsatarate1to2percentagepointshigherthan overnightlendingrates.“Byeliminatingmuchoftheriskthateligibleissuerswillnotbeabletorepayinvestorsbyrollingovertheirmaturingcommercialpaperobligations,thisfacilityshouldencourageinvestorstoonceagainengageintermlendinginthecommercialpapermarket,”theFedsaid.“Animprovedcommercialpapermarketwillenhancetheabilityofbusinessestomaintainemploymentandinvestmentasthenationdealswiththecoronavirusoutbreak.”Aswithothernon-banklendingfacilities,theFedinvokedSection13(3)andreceivedpermissionfromtheU.S.Treasury,whichput$10billionintotheCPFFtocoveranylosses.TheCommercialPaperFundingFacility lapsedonMarch31,2021. Supportingloanstosmall-andmid-sizedbusinesses: TheFed’s MainStreetLendingProgram,announcedonApril9,2020,aimedtosupportbusinessestoolargefortheSmallBusinessAdministration’s PaycheckProtectionProgram(PPP) andtoosmallfortheFed’stwocorporatecreditfacilities.Theprogramwassubsequentlyexpandedandbroadenedtoincludemorepotentialborrowers.Throughthreefacilities—the NewLoansFacility, ExpandedLoansFacility,andPriorityLoansFacility—theFedwaspreparedtofundupto$600billioninfive-yearloans.Businesseswithupto15,000employeesorupto$5billioninannualrevenuecouldparticipate.InJune2020,theFedloweredtheminimumloansizeforNewLoansandPriorityLoans,increasedthemaximumforallfacilities,andextendedtherepaymentperiod.Aswithotherfacilities,theFedinvokedSection13(3)andreceivedpermissionfromtheU.S.Treasury,whichthroughtheCARESActput$75billionintothethreeMainStreetProgramstocoverlosses.Borrowersaresubjecttorestrictionsonstockbuybacks,dividends,andexecutivecompensation.(See here foradditionaloperationaldetails.)SecretaryMnuchin,againovertheFed’sobjections,decidedthattheMainStreetfacilitywould stoptakingloansubmissionsonDecember14,2020,asitwassettomakeitsfinalpurchasesbyJanuary8,2021. TheFedalsoestablisheda PaycheckProtectionProgramLiquidityFacility thatfacilitatedloansmadeunderthePPP.BankslendingtosmallbusinessescouldborrowfromthefacilityusingPPPloansascollateral.ThePPPLiquidityFacilityclosedonJuly30,2021. Supportingloanstonon-profitinstitutions: InJuly2020,theFedexpandedtheMainStreetLendingProgramto non-profits,includinghospitals,schools,andsocialserviceorganizationsthatwereinsoundfinancialconditionbeforethepandemic.Borrowersneededatleast10employeesandendowmentsofnomorethan$3billion,amongothereligibilityconditions.Theloanswereforfiveyears,butpaymentofprincipalwasdeferredforthefirsttwoyears.Aswithloanstobusinesses,lendersretained5percentoftheloans.ThisadditiontotheMainStreetprogramlapsedwiththerestofthefacilityonJanuary8,2021. SupportingHouseholdsandConsumers TermAsset-BackedSecuritiesLoanFacility (TALF): Throughthisfacility,reestablishedonMarch23,2020,theFedsupportedhouseholds,consumers,andsmallbusinessesbylendingtoholdersofasset-backedsecuritiescollateralizedbynewloans.Theseloansincludedstudentloans,autoloans,creditcardloans,andloansguaranteedbytheSBA.Inastepbeyondthecrisis-eraprogram,theFedexpandedeligiblecollateraltoincludeexistingcommercialmortgage-backedsecuritiesandnewlyissuedcollateralizedloanobligationsofthehighestquality.Liketheprogramssupportingcorporatelending,theFedsaidtheTALFwouldinitiallysupportupto$100billioninnewcredit.Torestartit,theFedinvokedSection13(3)andreceivedpermissionfromtheTreasury,whichallocated$10billionfromtheExchangeStabilizationFundtofinancetheprogram.Withoutanextension, thisfacilitystoppedmakingpurchasesonDecember31,2020,atSecretaryMnuchin’sorder. SupportingStateandMunicipalBorrowing Directlendingtostateandmunicipalgovernments: Duringthe2007-09financialcrisis,theFedresistedbackstoppingmunicipalandstateborrowing,seeingthatastheresponsibilityoftheadministrationandCongress.Butinthiscrisis,theFedlentdirectlytostateandlocalgovernmentsthroughthe MunicipalLiquidityFacility,whichwascreatedon April9,2020.TheFedexpandedthelistofeligibleborrowerson April27 and June3,2020.Themunicipalbondmarketwasunder enormousstressinMarch2020,andstateandmunicipalgovernmentsfounditincreasinglyhardtoborrowastheybattledCOVID-19.TheFed’sfacilityofferedloanstoU.S.states,includingtheDistrictofColumbia,countieswithatleast500,000residents,andcitieswithatleast250,000residents.Throughtheprogram,theFedmade$500billionavailabletogovernmententitiesthathadinvestment-gradecreditratingsasofApril8,2020,inexchangefornotestiedtofuturetaxrevenueswithmaturitiesoflessthanthreeyears.InJune2020, Illinois becamethefirstgovernmententitytotapthefacility.Underchangesannouncedthatmonth,theFedallowedgovernorsinstateswithcitiesandcountiesthatdidnotmeetthepopulationthresholdtodesignateuptotwolocalitiestoparticipate.Governorswerealsoabletodesignatetworevenuebondissuers—airports,tollfacilities,utilities,publictransit—tobeeligible.The NewYorkMetropolitanTransportationAuthority (MTA)tookadvantageofthisprovisioninAugust,borrowing$451millionfromthefacility.TheFedinvokedSection13(3)withtheapprovaloftheU.S.Treasury,whichusedtheCARESActtoprovide$35billiontocoveranypotentiallosses.(See here foradditionaldetails.)The MunicipalLiquidityFacilitystoppedpurchasesonDecember31,2020 whenitlostTreasurysupport,perSecretaryMnuchin’sdecision. TheNewYorkMTAsecureda secondloan fromthefacilityonDecember10,2020,borrowing$2.9billionbeforelendinghalted. Supportingmunicipalbondliquidity: TheFedalsousedtwoofitscreditfacilitiestobackstopmunimarkets.ItexpandedtheeligiblecollateralfortheMMLFtoincludemunicipalvariable-ratedemandnotesandhighlyratedmunicipaldebtwithmaturitiesofupto12months.TheFedalsoexpandedtheeligiblecollateraloftheCPFFtoincludehigh-qualitycommercialpaperbackedbytax-exemptstateandmunicipalsecurities.Thesestepsallowedbankstofunnelcashintothemunicipaldebtmarket,wherestresshadbeenbuildingduetoalackofliquidity. WHYWERETHEFED’SACTIONSIMPORTANT? Stepstakenbyfederal,state,andlocalofficialstomitigatethespreadoftheviruslimitedeconomicactivity,leadingtoasuddenanddeeprecessionwithmillionsofjobslost.TheFed’sactionsensuredthatcreditcontinuedtoflowtohouseholdsandbusinesses,preventingfinancialmarketdisruptionsfromintensifyingtheeconomicdamage. Inmanyothercountries,mostcreditflowsthroughthebankingsystem.IntheU.S.,asubstantialamountofcreditflowsthroughcapitalmarkets,sotheFedworkedtokeepthemfunctioningassmoothlyaspossible.Asoneofourcolleagues,DonKohn,formerFederalReserveViceChair, saidinMarch2020: “TheTreasurymarketinparticularisthefoundationfortradinginmanyothersecuritiesmarketsintheU.S.andaroundtheworld;ifit’sdisrupted,thefunctioningofeverymarketwillbeimpaired.TheFed’spurchaseofsecuritiesisexplicitlyaimedatimprovingthefunctioningoftheTreasuryandMBSmarkets,wheremarketliquidityhadbeenwellbelowparinrecentdays.” ButtargetingtheTreasurymarketprovedinsufficient,giventheseverityoftheCOVIDrecessionandthedisruptionofflowsofcreditacrossotherfinancialmarkets.SotheFedinterveneddirectlyinthemarketsforcorporateandmunicipaldebttoensurethatkeyeconomicactorscouldraisefundstopayworkersandavoidbankruptcies.Thesemeasuresaimedtohelpbusinessessurvivethecrisisandresumehiringandproductionwhenthepandemicebbed. Banksalsoneededsupporttokeepcreditflowing.Whenfinancialmarketsareclogged,firmstendtodrawonbanklinesofcredit,whichcanleadbankstopullbackonlendingorsellingTreasuryandothersecurities.TheFedsuppliedunlimitedliquiditytofinancialinstitutionssotheycouldmeetcreditdrawdownsandmakenewloanstobusinessesandhouseholdsfeelingfinancialstrains. Theauthorsdidnotreceivefinancialsupportfromanyfirmorpersonforthisarticleorfromanyfirmorpersonwithafinancialorpoliticalinterestinthisarticle.Theyarenotcurrentlyanofficers,directors,orboardmembersofanyorganizationwithafinancialorpoliticalinterestinthisarticle.PriortohisconsultingworkforBrookings,DaveSkidmorewasemployedbytheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem. RelatedContent UpFront TheFedshouldclarifyhowbankscandeploycapitalandliquidity NellieLiang Friday,March20,2020 UpFront Howwillthecoronavirusaffectstateandlocalgovernmentbudgets? 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